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Ever since deposit insurance was 
introduced, economists and policymak-
ers have been trying to correct its unin-
tended consequences. The heart of the 
problem is that deposit insurance coun-
teracts the natural market forces that 
would ordinarily keep banks from tak-
ing on too much risk. For most ﬁ  rms, 
taking on more risk means they have 
to pay more to raise money because 
investors demand a higher return to 
cover the risk. But banks can avoid 
such direct market pressure because 
depositors, who know that their depos-
its are guaranteed, have little incentive 
to demand a higher rate or withdraw 
their funds.
One proposed means of injecting more 
market discipline into the banking sec-
tor is a subordinated debt requirement. 
It would compel banks to issue some 
debt that the government does not 
guarantee and that is paid off only after 
all depositors have been satisﬁ  ed. A 
mandatory subordinated debt require-
ment was one of the reforms recom-
mended in a 1986 study commissioned 
by the American Bankers Association. 
In addition, the Financial Moderniza-
tion Act of 1999 requires that large 
banking companies have outstanding, 
at all times, at least one (though not 
necessarily a subordinated) debt issue 
rated by a commercial credit-rating 
agency. 
Some experts argue that subordi-
nated debt is unnecessary because 
equity capital already gives deposi-
tors and other bank creditors a layer 
of protection. But banks’ equity—that 
is, their stock—rises when their prof-
its increase, so the prospect of higher 
equity can encourage them to take 
greater risks. Debt is more sensitive 
than equity to the loss aspect of risk 
because it lacks the upside inducement 
of higher proﬁ  ts. Subordinated debt 
thus gives a bank’s depositors and gen-
eral creditors the same protection from 
losses as equity does, without creating 
the incentive to assume more risk. 
An important channel through which 
subordinated creditors can exert market-
based discipline is the pricing of subor-
dinated debt: Risky banks would have 
to pay higher interest rates than safe 
banks to issue such debt. Because sub-
ordinated debt is paid back only after 
depositors are, those holding it absorb 
losses that would otherwise accrue to 
uninsured depositors and the deposit 
insurance fund. Unlike depositors, sub-
ordinated creditors cannot be sure they 
will be able to withdraw their funds 
from a bank whose solvency comes 
into question. As a result, the yield 
on banks’ subordinated debt should 
vary with the riskiness of the bank, 
and decisions by bank managers and 
shareholders to increase their institu-
tions’ risk would raise the cost of issu-
ing debt. 
Whether repricing three to four 
percent of a bank’s funds (the typical 
share required in most mandatory sub-
ordinated-debt proposals) would exert 
meaningful discipline on risk-taking 
remains debatable. However, to the 
extent that yields on new and outstand-
ing subordinated debt reﬂ  ect underly-
ing risk, mandatory subordinated-debt 
requirements could give markets and 
bank supervisors useful information 
on the riskiness of banking compa-
nies. A review of recent research on the 
information that can be gleaned from 
these yields, however, suggests that 
much more work needs to be done on 
extracting useful, reliable risk indica-
tors from them before a subordinated 
debt requirement for banks is war-
ranted.
 Credit Spreads
To extract information from subor-
dinated-debt yields about investors’ 
perceptions of the underlying riski-
ness of various issuers, researchers 
must remove other sorts of informa-
tion from the yields, such as that which 
reﬂ  ects changes in interest rates. To do 
this, they can construct a credit spread, 
which is calculated as the difference 
between the yield on a risky bond and 
a risk-free bond of the same maturity, 
typically a U.S. Treasury bond. Such 
a credit spread is often interpreted 
as the premium paid to bond hold-
ers for default risk. The risky bond’s 
yield must also be adjusted to account 
for other differences between the two 
types of bonds, such as embedded 
options, because these would affect 
the bond’s yield and be reﬂ  ected in 
the credit spread. One example of an 
embedded option is a call provision, 
which allows the issuer to buy a bond 
back at a previously set price. The 
Stock and bond prices contain all 
sorts of information about investors’ 
beliefs and expectations. For exam-
ple, the interest rate on bank debt not 
insured by the FDIC has information 
about the health of the banks issuing 
the debt. Unfortunately, difﬁ  culties 
in extracting information from these 
subordinated debt prices reduces the 
information’s usefulness to regulators 
and policymakers.issuer pays for this provision by offer-
ing a higher yield on the bond issue. 
If the yield of such a bond were unad-
justed for the call provision, the dif-
ference in yields between a callable 
bond and a Treasury bond of the same 
maturity would overstate the default 
risk because it includes the value of 
the call. Collateral is another type of 
embedded option. By offering a bond-
holder the security associated with col-
lateral, a company can issue the debt 
at a lower yield than the overall credit 
quality of the ﬁ  rm would dictate. Con-
sequently, credit spreads on collateral-
ized bonds understate the issuer’s true 
default-risk premium. 
As these examples show, to compute 
a credit spread consistently across 
bond issues and across issuers, one 
must either restrict the sample of risky 
bonds to plain vanilla issues—that is, 
straight ﬁ  xed-coupon debt issues with 
no embedded options or other provi-
sions—or adjust the yield for whatever 
bells and whistles come with the issue. 
The good news is that corporations 
are increasingly issuing plain vanilla 
bonds. 
However, even a large sample of plain 
vanilla bonds does not allow us to 
cleanly observe the information con-
tent of credit spreads related to default 
risk. After all, credit spreads measured 
as differences in yields between risky 
bonds and Treasury bonds reﬂ  ect not 
only credit risk but also liquidity pre-
miums, tax differences between cor-
porate and U.S. government debt, and 
other factors. The evidence suggests 
that on average, as little as 25 per-
cent of measured credit spreads can be 
attributed to default risk.
 Extracting Useful 
Information 
It is helpful to think of the credit 
spread as a noisy signal of default risk. 
Credit spread movements may result 
from changes in default risk or one 
of the other factors that determine the 
yield difference between a risky bond 
and a risk-free bond of the same matu-
rity. In fact, the spread can decrease, 
even when default risk rises, if there 
are offsetting changes in tax effects or 
liquidity premiums. Therefore, using 
the credit spread as a signal of bank 
risk makes sense only if the signal-to-
noise ratio is high enough to produce 
reliable information.
Although the simplest way to compute 
a credit spread is to subtract a risk-free 
yield from a risky one, an alternative, 
less straightforward approach offers 
some signiﬁ  cant advantages. It uses 
advances in the theoretical modeling 
of credit spreads to construct entire 
spread curves for a sample of banking 
companies and for a sample of non-
bank ﬁ  rms. The so-called reduced-
form method of pricing risky bonds, 
pioneered by Darrell Dufﬁ  e, Ken 
Singleton, Robert Jarrow, and Stuart 
Turnbull, among others, constructs a 
model of how likely each ﬁ  rm is to 
default, how much investors will lose 
if it does, and how the likelihood of 
default changes with other interest 
rates. If the default model is calibrated 
with the yields on both risky and risk-
free bonds that are actually traded 
in the market, it can be used to esti-
mate the yields on bonds that are not 
traded—those with different maturities 
or even with embedded options. The 
observed interest rates imply certain 
values for items, such as the chance 
of default, and once we pin down 
those numbers, the model then lets us 
price bonds of any maturity, or even 
options on those bonds. This allows the 
researcher to create an “implicit” credit 
spread for every possible maturity, 
even if no bond of that maturity is cur-
rently trading. The credit spread curve 
is essentially a term structure of credit 
spreads for each ﬁ  rm at a point in time. 
One advantage of backing credit 
spreads out of a theoretical pricing 
model is that this method implicitly 
controls for spread components, such 
as liquidity and tax premiums, that are 
unrelated to default-risk premiums. 
Compared with simple credit spreads 
(computed as the difference between 
risky and risk-free bond yields) differ-
ences in model-based credit spreads 
across ﬁ  rms in the sample are more 
likely to result from differences in 
default-risk premiums than from 
liquidity and tax effects. Having an 
entire term structure of credit spreads 
makes it easier to compare them across 
ﬁ  rms and through time. In contrast, 
the simple yield-differential approach 
can only use credit spreads at points 
on the maturity spectrum where both 
risky and riskless bond yields can be 
observed. Finally, by constructing an 
entire credit spread curve for each ﬁ  rm 
in the sample at each point in time, 
researchers can assess whether its 
level, slope, and curvature contain any 
useful information. 
A natural ﬁ  rst question is, do credit 
spreads really reﬂ  ect credit risk? To 
rephrase it, do ﬁ  rms with larger credit 
spreads have a higher risk of default? 
The answer to this question is encour-
aging: Data from two different points 
on the curve, three and seven years, 
show that banks with larger credit 
spreads also have a higher risk of 
default (as measured by balance sheets 
and income statements). Years three 
and seven were chosen for evaluation 
because the credit spread curve is con-
structed mostly from observed bond 
prices that have maturities between 
two and ten years, and the credit 
spreads in the three- to seven-year 
range were measured with the most 
precision. 
Measures of bank risk include prox-
ies for earnings strength, asset quality, 
asset risk, and balance sheet lever-
age; studies of 1980s’ bank failures 
have shown that these factors are col-
lectively related to the probability of 
failure. (It is difﬁ  cult to look directly 
at failed banks’ credit spreads for a 
couple of reasons: First, bank failures 
are concentrated in smaller institutions, 
which are unlikely to have traded 
issues of subordinated debt. Second, 
most available data on banks’ subor-
dinated-debt prices are from the past 
10 to 15 years, a period of relatively 
strong performance with few problem 
banks and even fewer bank failures.) 
The answer to the next question, 
whether changes in bank risk are 
reﬂ  ected in changes in credit spreads, 
is less encouraging. There seems to 
be no consistent relationship between 
changes in credit spreads and changes 
in bank-risk measures. If credit spreads 
reﬂ  ect risk, why don’t changes in 
one reﬂ  ect changes in the other? The 
problem arises because credit spreads 
depend on changes in three factors: 
the probability of default, the expected 
loss in the event of default, and the 
market price of risk. Only the ﬁ  rst 
two are related to balance sheet fun-
damentals. If the market price of risk 
changes, as other evidence from ﬁ  nan-
cial markets suggests, it introduces 
noise into the process of credit spread 
changes, so the tenuous relationship 
between credit spread changes and accounting-risk variables is not sur-
prising. However, it does suggest that 
yields on bank-issued subordinated 
debt might not be a useful indicator of 
changes in a bank’s condition. 
A single spread may not predict 
changes in bank risk, but the overall 
shape of a credit spread curve does. 
In particular, a steeper curve predicts 
that the bank will become riskier in 
the near future. The credit spread slope 
predicts future bank-speciﬁ  c risk (mea-
sured with data from bank balance 
sheets and income statements), even 
after controlling for current accounting 
measures of bank risk, ﬁ  rms’ credit rat-
ings, the current level of credit spreads, 
and economywide information. Over-
all, the data show a signiﬁ  cant relation-
ship between the credit spread slope 
and future accounting measures of 
bank risk. 
 Designing a System
Several methods for imposing a sub-
ordinated debt requirement on banks 
have been proposed. Understanding 
the forces that move credit spreads can 
inform decisions about how to design 
a mandatory subordinated debt sys-
tem; moreover, the objectives of any 
such design should be carefully con-
sidered. For instance, if the debt’s pur-
pose is to create a loss buffer to protect 
uninsured depositors and the FDIC, it 
might be advisable to issue only long-
term subordinated debt, and only infre-
quently. In that case, questions about 
how well the credit spread reﬂ  ects the 
bank’s true risk are immaterial. On the 
other hand, if the purpose of subordi-
nated debt is to provide a market-based 
signal of changes in banks’ credit qual-
ity, then the debt should be designed 
to enhance that signal. Generating an 
information-rich credit spread curve 
might require having several subordi-
nated debt issues outstanding at any 
point, as well as a wide range of matur-
ities. Moreover, because the greatest 
amount of information about a ﬁ  rm 
is generated at the time it issues debt, 
relatively frequent issuance would be 
desirable. 
Some features of the debt matter a lot 
for the link between bank risk and the 
credit spread, and some matter hardly 
at all. For instance, the information 
content of credit spreads seems insen-
sitive to whether the bank issues ﬁ  xed- 
or ﬂ  oating-rate debt (the bond equiva-
lent of an adjustable-rate mortgage). 
This leaves no compelling reason for 
regulators to specify which sort of debt 
the banks should issue. One of the 
earliest proposals for a subordinated 
debt requirement wanted the debt to 
be putable—meaning that debt hold-
ers could sell bonds back to the issuer 
at a predetermined price—as a way to 
take some discretion out of the hands 
of regulators. That is, if investors see 
a risky bank, they can discipline it by 
making it buy back the debt and thus 
reducing the bank’s size. 
Unfortunately, ﬁ  xing one problem cre-
ates another. Making ﬁ  xed-rate debt 
putable destroys its usefulness as a 
signal of risk. Credit spreads on such 
debt often bear very little relationship, 
or even a perverse relationship, to the 
bank’s underlying risk. So it would 
seem that the designer of a subordi-
nated debt requirement would need to 
choose between using the debt to limit 
regulatory discretion in closing banks 
and using credit spreads on that debt as 
a risk signal. 
Fortunately, a small adjustment, chang-
ing the interest rate on the putable debt 
from ﬁ  xed to ﬂ  oating, allows the risk 
signal embedded in the credit spread to 
be sorted out from the changing value 
of the put option attached to the sub-
ordinated debt. Thus, in principle, it 
allows both early closure and risk sig-
nal properties to be incorporated into a 
subordinated debt requirement. 
 Conclusion
Evidence on credit spreads and credit 
spread curves suggests that these 
sources of information could one day 
become useful to bank regulatory 
agencies. At this time, however, the 
evidence is too weak to justify impos-
ing a mandatory subordinated debt 
requirement, especially if its purpose is 
to increase market discipline on bank-
ing companies and give bank supervi-
sors better information about banks’ 
changing conditions. Before supervi-
sors add credit spreads from subordi-
nated debt to their dashboard of early 
warning signals of deteriorating bank 
conditions, much more work must be 
done on extracting useful, reliable risk 
indicators. So, despite some encourag-
ing results, we need considerably more 
evidence on the value of credit spread 
information to regulators and markets 
before deciding to impose any new 
rule on how banks fund themselves.
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